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Abstract
We find that retail investors on aggregate are less attracted to stocks with highly skewed
returns after an exogenous increase in stock tradability. Using data on the number of
Robinhood investors owning U.S. stocks, we estimate the effect of the newly introduced
Fractional Share Trading service to causally reduce retail investor holdings of such stocks
by 30.78%. This finding is significant at the 10% level and is estimated using a Regression
Discontinuity Design. Through a Difference-in-Difference analysis, we estimate a causal
increase in the number of retail investors holding stocks that can be traded fractionally.
However, when running a subgroup analysis of stocks with above median return skewness,
retail investors’ demand for such stocks is about 50% lower than for their low-skewed
counterparts. Nevertheless, as both results from the DiD analysis are insignificant, they
provide no conclusive answer. Lastly, using standard OLS, we observe that the significant
positive relationship between skewness of stock returns and retail investment disappears
once we control for stock tradability. Although these results are subject to uncertainty,
all our findings suggest that wealth constraints can help explain why we observe an
overrepresentation of retail investors in lottery-type stocks.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse why retail investors are overly represented in
lottery-type stocks. These are stocks that are (1) low-priced and (2) exhibit high return
skewness. A portfolio of such stocks historically underperforms in the stock market by
about 4% (Kumar, 2009) – a phenomenon which has been hypothesized to stem from
retail investors’ attraction to lottery-type payoffs. We hypothesize that budget constraints
cause retail investors to be overexposed to stocks with high return skewness – causing
their aggregate demand for lottery-type stocks to increase.
To test our hypothesis, we exploit the fact that the Robinhood trading platform
only offers fractional share trading (FST) of stocks that report a market capitalization
above $25 million and a price above $1 (Robinhood, 2020). This new service allows investors
to purchase as little as one millionth of a stock, conditional on the stock satisfying the
two criteria. Eligibility for this service allows for a Regression Discontinuity Design, in
which we seek to establish whether there is a significant discontinuity in the number of
Robinhood users holding stocks with highly skewed returns at the market capitalization
threshold. Our choice to apply the market capitalization threshold is explained in greater
detail in section 7.1. Using our RD design, we document a significantly negative causal
treatment effect of 30.78% in retail investor holdings of stocks with the highest return
skewness. However, this effect is only significant at the 10% level and when applying the
broadest bandwidth.
We also include a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) design to test our hypothesis
on retail investors’ budget constraints. Through the DiD method, we compare the mean
difference in the number of Robinhood users owning low- and high priced stocks before
and after the introduction of FST. Our results yield a positive causal effect in the number
of users holding high-priced stocks when they are traded fractionally, although the effect
is non-significant. To extend on this result, we run a subgroup analysis to estimate the
effect of FST on retail investor ownership of high-priced stocks with high return skewness.
The treatment effect differs by about -50% for stocks with high return skewness compared
to stocks with low return skewness. Thus, the causal increase in the number of users
purchasing high-priced stocks after introducing fractional share trading is smaller for
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stocks with high return skewness. Although these results are in line with our hypothesis,
they are insignificant, and we cannot give any conclusive answer using the DiD analyses.
Finally, we use OLS regression to test the relationship between stock return
skewness and the number of Robinhood users holding stocks. Using eligibility for fractional
share trading as our tradability proxy, the strongly significant and positive relationship
between return skewness and number of retail investors holding stocks disappears once
tradability is controlled for.
Although the results in both experimental designs are subject to considerable
uncertainty, we observe the same trend across all three models: retail investors shift
towards stocks with less skewed returns once their capital limitations are reduced. That is
also the key takeaway of this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
So far, retail investors’ excessive appetite for lottery-type payoffs have been thought to
be a central cause of negative lottery premiums in the stock market. Stocks with highly
skewed return features and low nominal prices are believed to be stock market equivalents
of lottery tickets, and a portfolio of such stocks historically yields negative premiums (Bali
et al., 2011). Several researchers have noted that retail investors are overly represented in
these lottery-type stocks, which is why this group is thought to fuel the negative lottery
premiums (Bali et al., 2011) (Han and Kumar, 2008). However, the view is split among
researchers whether retail investors are drawn towards these stocks because they are
wealth constrained towards low-priced stocks, or because they use low stock prices as a
proxy for return skewness.
As there is a strong inverse relationship between nominal stock prices and return
skewness, one cannot easily determine whether retail investors choose these stocks due to
their perceived return skewness or their low price (Birru and Wang, 2016). We argue that
retail investors are limited to a low-price investment universe that is inherently overweight
in stocks with high return skewness. Their capital limitations will thus effectively alter
their inclination towards stocks with high return skewness. We therefore seek to answer
the following research question:
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Do capital limitations cause retail investors to overinvest in stocks with highly
skewed returns?
The Robinhood trading platform introduced Fractional Share Trading to their
customers in late 2019, effectively removing the price barrier of stock investing. However,
only stocks with a market capitalization equal to or above $25 million and price above
$1 are eligible for being traded fractionally. If we hypothesize correctly, we expect to
observe a decreased appetite for return skewness if investors are able to choose freely
among stocks, independent of their nominal stock price.
1.2 Background
Based on the historical literature on gambling, it is likely that there exist investors that are
willing to pay for lottery-type payoffs in the stock market. The prospect theory proposed
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) explains this observation by arguing that decision
weights are assigned differently between gains and losses, which causes overweighting
of the tails of a payoff distribution. This bias can help explain why one might see an
overpricing of stocks with positively skewed returns, since skewed returns is a preference
of which investors are willing to pay (Barberis and Huang, 2007).
To objectively observe stock market gambling, Kumar (2009) identifies stocks
exhibiting lottery features as a proxy for observing gambling-motivated behavior in the
stock market. Based on insights gathered from state lottery tickets and studies, he defines
lottery stocks as stocks exhibiting (1) low price, (2) high idiosyncratic volatility and
(3) high idiosyncratic skewness in their returns. However, research by Bali et al. (2011)
find that, when controlling for past maximum returns, idiosyncratic volatility turns out
insignificant. This finding implies that idiosyncratic volatility merely proxies for skewness.
Accordingly, we do not consider idiosyncratic volatility as a lottery stock characteristic
moving forward. Low-priced stocks with highly skewed returns are therefore the lottery
stocks we will be researching in this paper.
In their early-stage empirical results, Downs and Wen (2001) document the
existence of “lottery premiums” – the willing sacrifice in average returns that investors pay
for a remote chance to earn an abnormally positive return. They also find overpricing to
be prevalent in low-priced stocks, and that the negative premiums associated with these
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stocks tend to increase as the nominal stock price decrease. Kumar (2009) later extended
the definition of lottery stocks to also include high return skewness and high volatility.




The existing literature collectively hypothesize that retail investors might be a driving
force behind lottery premiums1. Several studies find correlations between lottery stocks
and retail investors. For example, Kumar (2009) finds that preferences for lottery stocks
are dominant among individual investors and that institutional investors show a preference
against lottery-type stocks. Bali et al. (2011) complement these findings by noting that
retail investors exhibit higher preferences for lottery-like stocks. However, as lottery-like
stocks are defined as having low prices and high return skewness, the fact that these
characteristics are interrelated complicates the assumption on retail investment preferences
for such assets. In other words, to what extent retail investors seek low prices and skewed
returns as a joint combination is not straightforward.
One reason for retail investors’ overweight in lottery-type stocks might be their
capital limitations, and not an excessive preference for lottery-type payoffs. Proponents of
the Marketability Hypothesis argue that retail investors are limited to low-priced stocks,
providing an incentive for management to lower their stock prices through stock splits as
a marketability scheme2. This hypothesis is based on a diversification argument, as share
prices cannot rise too high before retail investors need a significant amount of capital to
diversify a portfolio of high-priced stocks (Baker and Gallagher, 1980). If true, there might
be a case for reverse causality in the argument of retail investors seeking lottery-type
payoffs. Because stocks with low prices are found to have inherently more skewed returns
than high-priced stocks, this relationship suggests that retail investors are effectively
limited to an investment universe that is more lottery-like than others (Benartzi et al.,
2009) (Birru and Wang, 2016).
On the other hand, retail investors might concentrate in low-priced stocks exactly
because these stocks have higher return skewness than high-priced stocks. Research on
nominal prices find that investors tend to overestimate the return skewness of low-priced
stocks, potentially enhancing any preferences towards such stocks, as this characteristic
will proxy for skewness. This finding is rooted in a biological bias, in which investors often
view a low-priced stock as having more upside potential than a high-priced stock, because
1
See for example Han and Kumar (2008), Kumar (2009) or Bali et al. (2011).
2
See Schultz (2000), Easley et al. (2001) and Dahr et al. (2004).
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the former is closer to zero and farther from infinity (Birru and Wang, 2016).
However, the Achilles’ heel of the lottery stock portfolio set forward by recent
literature, is the way in which retail investors are expected to identify the lottery-stocks to
pursue, given that high return skewness in fact is their preference. This view implies that
investors need to somehow estimate and compare the skewness of stock returns in the
market. Kumar (2009) argues that "certain salient stock characteristics", such as industry
or media coverage, might be one way to do so. However, he recognizes that extrapolating
previous maximum returns into the future, and then comparing nominal stock prices is
the most likely way in which retail investors identify and compare skewness.
While there is reason to believe that retail investors follow the maximum return
strategy to a certain extent, research on nominal stock prices suggests that retail investors
tend to categorize stocks based on price, implying that stock prices are important to retail
investors (Green and Hwang, 2009). Support for this view is found in several studies
conducted on stock splits3. Dyl and Elliott (2006) complement these findings by adding
that retail investors tend to hold lower priced stocks than institutions. (Benartzi et al.,
2009). If retail investors in fact categorize stocks based on their price, the previously
mentioned inverse relationship between skewness and stock prices will ensure that their
investment categories will differ in terms of return skewness.
Based on the reviewed literature, it is difficult to answer whether preferences for
lottery-like stocks stem from preferences for skewed returns or a constraint towards low
prices. While investors certainly can have extraordinarily high preferences for skewness
while also having budget constraints, budget-constrained retail investors are nonetheless
biased towards lottery-like stocks due to the inverse relationship between nominal prices
and return skewness. Thus, retail investors on an aggregate level might be more inclined to
purchase stocks with highly skewed returns as a consequence of their budget constraints.
In sum, whether retail investors predominantly pursue lottery stocks due to their
highly skewed features, or due to their budget constraining them to low-priced stocks,
remains an unanswered question which this thesis will try to answer.
3
See Schultz (2000), Easley et al. (2001) and Dahr et al. (2004).
7
3 Hypotheses
To follow up on the views presented in the literature review, there is a mixture of hypotheses
why retail investors concentrate in lottery stocks. Whereas low nominal prices could be a
lottery preference due to the illusion of skewed returns, it might also be a preference due
to the fact that it allows for diversification for investors with limited capital. We therefore
have two main hypotheses that might explain retail investors’ preferences for lottery-type
stocks.
Due to wealth constraints, retail investors’ portfolios are effectively limited to
a low-priced universe of stocks – potentially causing them to overinvest in lottery-type
stocks, as these are low-priced by definition. Therefore, we expect retail investors to show
less preference for stocks with highly skewed returns if given access to a wider investment
universe through the introduction of fractional share trading. We will call this hypothesis
the Wealth Constraint Hypothesis moving forward.
A second hypothesis however, is that retail investors in fact value skewness
more than price. If that is the case, retail investors should exhibit significantly increased
attraction towards stocks with highly skewed returns, given that they are able to trade
fractionally. We will call this hypothesis the Lottery Preference Hypothesis.
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4 Methodology
We use four different methodologies in attempting to answer our research question. First,
inspired by Kumar (2009), we investigate the existence of lottery stock premiums in the
American stock market during the last two decades, as the existence of such premiums
serves as the essence of our thesis. To do so, we use the two-factor model of Harvey and
Siddique (2000) to measure the characteristics necessary to identify lottery-type stocks,
i.e. idiosyncratic volatility and idiosyncratic skewness. Following our argumentation in
section 1.2, we use a redefined definition of lottery stocks, sorting our lottery portfolio
solely based on price and idiosyncratic skewness. Using the sorted lottery portfolio, we
run cross-sectional regressions by method of Fama and MacBeth (1973) to estimate the
lottery premiums.
Included in our robustness analysis however, we also regress a lottery-portfolio
sorted on the three traditional characteristics (Kumar, 2009), for means of comparison
and to ensure the validity of our results. In doing so, we make use of Fama & French’s
three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993). As we also apply their asset pricing model to
estimate the three risk betas to use as controls in our regression analyses, the three-factor
model is briefly introduced in section 4.1.
Second, we exploit the fact that Robinhood does not offer Fractional Share
Trading for stocks with market capitalization below $25 million. This threshold allows
us to investigate retail investors’ preferences between skewed payoffs and nominal stock
prices, by comparing their stock holdings at the market capitalization threshold. Using
data on the number of Robinhood investors holding U.S. stocks, we apply a Regression
Discontinuity Design to determine whether there is a discontinuity in the number of retail
investors holding stocks with highly skewed returns at the threshold.
Third, we use the Difference-in-Difference framework to analyse the mean number
of retail investors holding stocks before and after the introduction of FST. Thus, we
compare the difference in the average number of Robinhood investors holding low- and
high-priced stocks before and after the introduction of FST. To test whether the FST
implementation had a different effect on stocks with high return skewness, we extend
this model to include an interaction term for stocks with above median skewness in their
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returns.
Lastly, we use OLS to estimate the correlation between retail investment and
stock return skewness. If our hypothesis is correct, we would expect to see a decreased
preference for stocks with skewed returns when we control for stock tradability.
4.1 Fama & French’s Three-Factor model
Fama & French’s 3-factor asset pricing model is an extension of the CAPM, including risk
proxies for size and value in addition to the market factor. By regressing stock market
returns on common risk factors for assets, this asset pricing model is empirically able to
explain up to 95% of variation in asset returns (Fama and French, 1993). In the following,
we will briefly explain the variables used and the method for which one can validate these
findings.
The three-factor model is named after three risk variables that is thought to
explain asset returns: market risk, size risk and value risk. The extension of this model
from the CAPM comes from adding the two latter risk factors; company size- and value.
These factors are included as a response to the empirical observation that small-cap stocks
and value-stocks outperform the rest of the market (Fama and French, 1993).
The market factor is computed as the daily excess return on the market of
all common stocks traded on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX, weighted by each stock’s
respective market values of June each year. As firms across different industries are subject
to different accounting regulations and deadlines, they use market values on common
reference dates each year to ensure comparability (Fama and French, 1993).
To obtain these estimates, Fama & French sort each stock by size and book-to-
market ratio on the last trading day each June, using their accounting data for December
of the previous fiscal year. These portfolios are then held until June of year t+1, at which
point the sorting repeats. Stocks with market capitalization below the median are assigned
as small-cap (S), the rest as large-cap (B). They use the .3 - and .7-quantiles to sort stocks
on book-to-market ratio. The top 30% are classified as firms with high book-to-market
value (H), the middle 40% as medium (M) and the bottom 30% as low (L). Lastly, using
these intersections of size and value, they form six value-weighted portfolios. S/L, S/M,
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S/H, B/L, B/M and B/H. To derive the stock market return factors, they compute the















SMB is the excess return on a zero-net-investment portfolio of small stocks minus
a portfolio of large-cap stocks, and HML is the excess return on a zero-net-investment
portfolio of high market-to-book ratio minus a portfolio of low market-to-book ratio. Thus,
these factors are added to the CAPM asset pricing model as SMB (Small minus Big) and
HML (High minus Low) (Fama and French, 1993). The final three-factor asset pricing
model can therefore be expressed as:
Rf   ri = ↵i +  i(Rm  Rf ) + siSMB + hiHML+ ✏i (4.3)
4.1.1 Lottery stock sorting
In order to construct the lottery-type portfolio, we identify stocks that (1) have low price
and (2) highly skewed returns. From the literature, low price is defined as below median
and high skewness is defined as above median. To measure the idiosyncratic skewness,
we adopt the established methodology of Harvey and Siddique (2000), and estimate the
two-factor model of the excess and squared market return measured over the past six
months:




First, we compute IVOL, which is derived as the standard deviation of the
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where Nt denotes the number of trading days and St is number of days in month t
After computing the idiosyncratic skewness of each stock observation, stocks are
sorted into portfolios of low (L) or high (H) price and low (L) or high (H) idiosyncratic
skewness. The Lottery-Type portfolio is defined as (L/H), and the Non-Lottery portfolio
is defined as (H/L). The remaining portfolios, (H/H) and (L/L), are defined as Other.
By adding these to the three-factor model of Fama & French, we can achieve estimates
for any premium on these portfolios. The final model of our lottery-type sorting is thus
defined as:
Rf   ri = ↵i +  i(Rm  Rf ) + siSMB + hiHML+ liLottery-Type+ (4.7)
nliNon-Lottery-Type + oiOther + ✏i
12
5 Data
From Compustat we obtain daily stock data from 2000 to 2020. For our analysis on lottery
stock premiums, we only use U.S.-based common stocks traded on NYSE, Nasdaq and
AMEX (Wharton Research Data Services, 2020). We also retrieve the data necessary to
compute the book equity of each stock. The detailed process of screening, cleaning and
matching these data can be found in section A1 of the appendix, while all variables in our
final data set are explained in section A2.
In order to investigate retail investors’ preferences, we also download popularity
data from Robinhood, reporting the daily number of users holding each stock (Robintrack,
2020). Using this data in conjunction with the daily stock data from Compustat, we are
able to observe the day-by-day developments in ownership of all stocks in our sample,
thus allowing us to perform aggregate analyses on retail investor behaviour. However, as
the Robinhood platform is fairly new, this data is only available from 2018 to present.
5.1 Limitations
The main analysis in this paper is limited to only the first six months of 2020, as the
Fractional Share Trading service was introduced in late December 2019. In combination
with lottery-type stocks by definition being rare, we are therefore left with a relatively
small data sample. With limited sample size, interpretation and inference of our estimates
and findings from the analyses thus call for conservatism.
Moreover, eligibility for fractional share trading is conditional on rules put forth
by Robinhood – namely that each stock must trade above $1 and have equal to or higher
than $25 million in market capitalization. As we are unable to directly observe whether
all stocks that satisfy these two rules are being traded fractionally, our analyses might be
corrupted by non-compliance.
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6 Replication of lottery stock premiums
As the scope of our paper is to investigate retail investors’ preferences for lottery-type
stocks, documenting the existence of lottery stock premiums is imperative. This part
therefore replicates the efforts of previous research related to estimating such premiums.
In addition, this process is also crucial to identify lottery-type stocks and to construct the
lottery portfolio needed for our main analysis. In the following, we report the results of
our estimation of such premiums in the American stock market. For additional analyses
on lottery portfolio performance, time-series effects and robustness analysis, we refer to
sections B1 - B5 of the appendix.
Since Kumar (2009) have previously identified negative lottery premiums in the
American stock market, and due to Vokatá (2012) reporting the existence of lottery stock
premiums on several of the big exchanges across Europe, we expect similar findings. In
accordance with the lottery stock sorting described in 4.1.1, we sort our sample in three
different portfolios based on stock price and idiosyncratic skewness. With basis in the
lottery portfolio, we conduct cross-sectional regressions to investigate the lottery stock
premiums across our sample period, using the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973).
6.1 Fama-MacBeth Two-Step Regression
The Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression is a two-step approach allowing us to observe
risk premiums over time, and deserves closer explanation. First, each individual excess
stock return is regressed against the time-series of the included explanatory variables, in
order to determine its exposure to each factor. Second, the cross-section of excess returns
is regressed once more against the factor exposures at each time t, yielding a time-series
of risk premia coefficients for each factor. The key insight of the Fama-MacBeth-approach
is to then average these coefficients, one for each factor, to obtain the premium expected
for a unit exposure to each risk factor over time. To achieve this premium we use the
following model specification:
Ri,t = ↵i,t + xi,tLotteryDummy +  i,tMKT + si,tSMB + hi,tHML+ (6.1)
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xi,tLog_mktcap+ xi,tbm+ xi,tLaggedR + ✏i,t
In order to isolate the effect of lottery-type stocks on value-weighted excess
returns, we specify a dummy variable (LotteryDummy), taking the value of 1 if a stock
has low price and returns with high idiosyncratic skewness. Hence, it is in particular
the coefficient sign and significance level of the LotteryDummy that are of interest to us.
Value-weighted excess stock return in month t+1 is the dependent variable, while monthly
risk factors (mkt, smb and hml), the log of market size, book-to-market ratio and lagged
6-month return are included in the model as controls.
Contrary to traditional panel data regressions – in which the common approach
is to use robust, clustered standard errors (HAC) to correct for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation – the procedure applied in the Fama-MacBeth-regression is considered
a special case. As mentioned, we estimate the regression separately for each month,
before testing hypotheses about the coefficient of interest by the t-statistic of the resulting
monthly coefficient estimates. Following the paper of Ibragimov and Muller (2010), the
Fama-MacBeth method yields valid inference as long as the monthly coefficient estimators
are approximately normal and independent, even on short panels that is heterogenous
over time.
6.2 Results
Table 6.1 reports evidence of negative and significant lottery premiums on our lottery-
type portfolio – which constitutes of stocks with price below median (L) and above
median return skewness (H). The monthly lottery premium, represented by the estimated
coefficient of the LotteryDummy, equals -0.501, which adds up to -6,01% on an annual
basis. This finding is thus consistent with the previous research of Kumar (2009), who
documented similar annual premiums on the American stock market of at least -4%.
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Table 6.1: Premiums on lottery-type portfolio
This table reports the Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression
estimates for the value-weighted excess return on the lottery-type portfolio. The main
variable of interest is the lottery dummy, assigning the value of 1 to all stocks that form
our lottery portfolio. Contemporaneous factor betas for the Fama-French risk factors
(mkt, smb, hml), size (log of market value), book-to-market and lagged 6-month return
are included as controls. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Dependent variable:




















Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
The market factor coefficient, mkt, is significant at the 1% level, and almost equal
to 1, as we would expect since our stock sample is a reasonable representation of the market.
Further, in our stock sample, high-value stocks receive positive and significant return
compensations, while the effect of small-cap stocks are negative, albeit not significant.
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In line with the predictions of Fama and French (1993) however, we would expect
small-cap stocks to outperform large-cap stocks - as they have done historically. One
plausible explanation why we observe the opposite relationship could be rooted in the
evidence of Switzer (2010), in which he documents that small-cap stocks tend to lag
large-cap stocks in periods leading up to business cycle peaks. Another possibility is that
it could be ascribed to the scope of the sample period included in our paper. As analyst
Erik Norland highlights, large-cap stocks (proxied by S&P 500) - mainly due to sustained
periods of economic expansion - have outperformed small-cap stocks (proxied by Russell
2000) since the end of 2013 until 2020 (Norland, 2020). In light of this observation, it
therefore makes sense that we observe the estimated coefficient for smb to be significantly
positive between 1999-2010, while it shifts to a negative sign when estimating it across
the full sample period. See table B5.1 in section B5 of the appendix for the complete
robustness analysis of our stock sample.
Stocks with past high returns (measured over the previous 6 months) however,
earn significantly lower returns. It seems reasonable to assume that stocks that exhibit
high returns will be subject to increased scrutiny and attention among retail investors.
Consequently, high returns could increase the possibility of overpricing in the next period
– which ultimately implies lower returns. The coefficient of LaggedR therefore have the
expected negative sign. We also note that Log_mktcap and bm, proxying for size and
value respectively, are both positive and significant. Finally, we report an R2 of 23%,
which means about 1/4 of the variation in monthly value-weighted returns is explained in
the model.
6.3 Descriptive statistics
To better understand the nature of the stocks in our lottery portfolio, and their inherent
features, we provide summary statistics of a broad range of firm-characteristics in Table
6.2 by method of Kumar (2009). For means of comparison, the non-lottery-type and other
portfolio are also included.
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Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics of lottery-type portfolio
This table reports monthly mean characteristics of lottery-type stocks measured over the
sample period from 2000 to 2020. Descriptive statistics of stocks in the non-lottery-type
and other portfolio are also reported for means of comparison. All characteristics
represent averages measured over the sample period.
Lottery-Type Non-Lottery-Type Other
Value-weighted return (in %) -1.50 1.03 -0.01
Number of stocks 511 495 1, 733
Market share (in %) 2.33 39.19 58.48
Idiosyncratic volatility 3.84 1.23 2.17
Idiosyncratic skewness 1.13 -0.69 0.04
Stock price 9.06 56.15 32.97
Market beta 1.03 0.72 0.88
SMB beta 0.97 0.20 0.53
HML beta 0.27 0.40 0.29
Firm size 768 13, 677 5, 843
Book-to-Market 1.10 0.57 0.79
Past MAX return (in %) 11.24 2.80 4.89
Past 12-month return (in %) -18.17 4.54 -2.68
On average, we observe that the lottery-type portfolio only account for just
above 2% of the total market, against almost 40% for the non-lottery-type portfolio. This
observation indicates that the lottery-type portfolio mainly consists of small-cap stocks.
We also draw a similar conclusion when comparing the averages of firm size across the
three portfolios.
Moreover, while lottery-type stocks on average earn considerably lower past
12-month returns, they however exhibit considerably higher average MAX, measured
as the maximum return observed over the previous month (t-1). In conjunction, these
two observed features suggest that the stocks in the lottery-type portfolio behaves in
accordance with findings of previous research – lottery stocks perform worse on average,
but at the same time exhibit a more pronounced potential of yielding extreme positive
returns.
6.4 Univariate analysis
Motivated by our preliminary findings, we further investigate our hypotheses by looking
for trends and patterns in our stock sample. To do so, we conduct two univariate analyses.
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We sort stocks into price deciles, and report the mean statistics of stock characteristics for
each decile. We also report summary statistics for Robinhood investors’ stock holdings -
from the least to the most popular decile.
By sorting stocks based on their price, we are able to observe whether there are
inherent differences in stock characteristics between low-priced and high-priced stocks. In
table 6.3, we provide summary statistics for the price deciles.
Table 6.3: Univariate analysis on price
This table reports mean characteristics of our stock sample, sorted in deciles by stock
price. The deciles are reported from lowest to highest.
Price IVOL ISKEW Lottery MktCap BM UsersHolding N
LowDecile 1.143 7.451 0.733 0.716 23.584 1.728 144, 445 109
D2 1.465 5.744 0.296 0.580 25.029 1.670 142, 135 100
D3 1.896 5.647 0.497 0.625 25.865 1.753 145, 964 104
D4 2.350 5.559 0.412 0.594 24.057 2.361 77, 390 101
D5 2.823 4.886 0.323 0.624 27.047 2.224 50, 314 101
D6 3.436 5.387 0.579 0.584 23.946 1.776 45, 410 101
D7 4.260 5.046 0.245 0.594 30.718 1.256 56, 677 101
D8 6.114 4.363 0.215 0.505 30.421 1.136 62, 787 105
D9 9.772 3.959 0.094 0.446 31.032 1.284 21, 486 101
HighDecile 21.067 3.501 0.074 0.485 35.002 1.733 10, 306 101
Observing the column for UsersHolding, which reports the total number of
Robinhood investors in each decile, there is a clear trend of attraction towards the
low-priced stocks. We also observe that the average skewness in returns of low-priced
(LowDecile) stocks is higher than for high-priced stocks (HighDecile). By conducting
a Welch two sample t-test of equality in group means, we reject the null hypothesis of
equality, with a reported t-statistic of 3.629. Thus, this difference is significant in both an
economical and a statistical sense. Moreover, this pattern is consistent with the findings
of Birru and Wang (2016), who find that low-priced stocks are inherently more skewed
in their returns than others. Hence, these observations are supportive of the Wealth
Constraint Hypothesis. The relationship between price and market capitalization also
moves in the opposite direction, which implies that high-cap stocks tend to have higher
stock prices. Lottery is a lottery stock indicator, and increases with high values of ISKEW
and low values of Price.
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To better understand the holdings of Robinhood investors, we also group the
stocks into deciles based on the number of investors holding each stock. In table 6.4 we
report the mean statistics for each decile.
Table 6.4: Univariate analysis on Robinhood investors’ stock holdings
This table reports mean characteristics of our stock sample, sorted in deciles based on
Robinhood investors’ holdings. The deciles are reported from lowest to highest.
UsersHolding IVOL ISKEW Price Lottery MktCap BM N
LowDecile 1, 941 3.347 0.017 16.686 0.453 31.637 1.806 106
D2 4, 940 3.913 0.290 9.640 0.524 30.424 1.334 103
D3 10, 031 4.552 0.156 5.255 0.485 27.195 1.152 101
D4 16, 918 5.413 0.335 4.047 0.618 26.392 1.660 102
D5 27, 004 5.536 0.551 3.561 0.604 26.247 2.059 106
D6 34, 077 5.298 0.381 3.253 0.600 31.668 2.426 100
D7 47, 363 6.100 0.583 3.351 0.616 21.955 2.164 99
D8 75, 945 5.560 0.347 2.511 0.613 25.367 1.458 106
D9 115, 572 5.923 0.349 2.540 0.626 28.180 1.517 99
HighDecile 423, 123 6.159 0.500 2.622 0.627 27.280 1.338 102
Inspecting table 6.4, there are several trends in the summary statistics worth
noting. First, there seems to be a negative relationship between the number of users
holding stocks and stock prices – consistent with the findings in table 6.3. Second,
we observe a positive relationship between the number of users holding stocks and the
idiosyncratic skewness, as the mean of ISKEW is higher for stocks with the highest
number of users holding, HighDecile. We test and find the difference in means of ISKEW
between the LowDecile and HighDecile to be significant, with a t-statistic of 2.642. This
observed pattern thus seem to suggest that stocks have significantly higher return skewness
when their retail investor ownership is high. This observation provides support to our
proposed Lottery Preference Hypothesis. Interestingly, we also observe that amount of
lottery-type stocks is lowest in the LowDecile.
Expanding further on our univariate analysis, we also plot the number of
Robinhood investors holding against both market capitalization and stock price. From
figure 6.1, we learn that retail investors on the Robinhood-platform concentrate in stocks
that have (1) low market capitalization and (2) low stock price. In particular, the
concentration of retail ownership is most pronounced when the stock price is arbitrarily
20 6.4 Univariate analysis
close to zero. These observations are thus consistent the views of Benartzi et al. (2009)
who argue that retail investors are limited from purchasing high-priced stocks due to
wealth constraints. In conjunction with the observed pattern from table 6.3 - in which
idiosyncratic skewness is significantly higher among low-priced stocks - the observed
behavior of retail investor concentration in low-priced stocks is also consistent with the
findings of Kumar (2009), who document that retail investors are overly represented in
lottery-type stocks.
Figure 6.1: Robinhood investors’ stock holdings, market capitalization and stock price
This figure plots the observed number of Robinhood investors holding each stock against
the stocks’ market capitalization and stock price, respectively.
By conducting univariate analyses on both price and the number of Robinhood
investors holding each stock, we have identified some notable trends in our stock sample.
Sorting on stock price, we reveal a negative trend between price and idiosyncratic skewness
– suggestive of low-priced stocks having inherently more skewed return features than
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high-priced stocks on average. Moreover, when we sort on the number of users holding, we
learn that there seem to exist a negative relationship between the number of users holding
and stock price. Observing the idiosyncratic skewness across the deciles, we also observe
that idiosyncratic skewness tends to be higher for the stocks with higher retail ownership.
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7 Lottery stock preferences and stock
tradability
As established in the literature review, the consensus seem to be that retail investors are
the dominant cause of lottery stock premiums (Kumar, 2009) (Bali et al., 2011). Having
documented the existence of such negative lottery stock premiums, we are subsequently
interested in determining what really causes retail investors to gravitate towards these
stocks. In this part, we therefore revisit our research question from the introduction –
seeking answers to whether it is the low price, or the inherent skewness in returns of
lottery stocks that attracts retail investors.
Through retail broker Robinhood’s introduction of the Fractional Share Trading
service, we are able to observe retail investor behaviour without a nominal price barrier –
as it enables retail investors to invest fractionally in stocks, widening their investment
universe to include stocks that were previously too expensive. As we have identified the
lottery stocks in the American market, we are able to compare these stocks to the ones
Robinhood’s investors are holding. Since FST is only offered for stocks reporting a market
capitalization of at least $25 million and price above $1, we exploit these thresholds to
test whether preferences for lottery-type stocks among retail investors persist after we
control for stock tradability.
7.1 Regression Discontinuity Design
To test the effects of fractional share trading on retail investors’ preferences, we apply
the method of Regression Discontinuity Design (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Accordingly,
we exploit that eligibility for the service is conditional on passing the threshold of $25
million and a trading price above $1. This analysis will however focus on the threshold of
$25 million, as it is reasonable to assume that retail investors’ capital constraint threshold
lies above $1. The purpose of this research design is therefore to analyse whether there is
a significant discontinuity in the average number of retail investors holding stocks with
skewed returns at the threshold of $25 million. Stocks above this threshold can be bought
fractionally, whereas stocks below cannot.
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As fractional share trading removes the price barrier for retail investors, we
exclude price as a lottery stock characteristic. Thus, our lottery portfolio is reconstructed
by only including stocks with above median idiosyncratic skewness. Furthermore, we
exclude all stocks with price below $1 as they are ineligible by definition. Stocks with
market capitalization above $50 million are also excluded from the analysis, as we consider
these observations as too different from the ones near the cut-point. The considerations
related to the comparability of eligible and ineligible stocks above and below the threshold
will be discussed in greater detail in section 7.4 when we assess the internal validity of our
RD design. Lastly, as the FST-service was implemented at December 16th, 2019, we use
data on Robinhood investors’ stock holdings from this date and forward to test the effect.
7.2 Graphical presentation
In figure 7.1, we plot the relationship between observed values of market capitalization
and the number of Robinhood investors holding each stock with return skewness above
median. We apply a bin size of 2 and market capitalization bandwidths of $5, $10 and
$25 million. These considerations are discussed further in section 7.4 and depicted in C2.
The graph in figure 7.1 shows a clear discontinuity near the cut-point for all
bandwidths. However, the relationship between users holding and market capitalization is
not consistent across all bandwidths. This inconsistency is a great concern for our model,
questioning the trustworthiness of our simple functional form. However, as the number of
observations is reduced significantly when changing the bandwidth to 10 or 5, one should
be aware of the uncertainty in these estimates. Nevertheless, the discontinuity in the
cut-off remains consistent across all bandwidths.
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Figure 7.1: Number of Robinhood investors holding stocks with above median return
skewness above and below the threshold of eligibility for fractional share trading
This figure shows the observed number of Robinhood investors holding stocks with above
median return skewness, above and below the eligibility threshold of $25M, under three
different bandwidth specifications. The dotted line represents a bandwidth of 25, the
dashed line a bandwidth of 10 and the bold line a bandwidth of 1. The vertical line
marks the cut-point for fractional share trading eligibility.
7.3 Retail investors’ preferences and stock tradability
Proxying for retail investors’ preferences, and included as our dependent variable, we use
the number of Robinhood users holding each individual stock with above median return
skewness. As the distribution of Users holding is positively skewed, it is log-transformed
to mitigate the effect of potential outliers. This transformation changes the interpretation
of the regression coefficients, in which a unit increase in our explanatory variables yield the
approximate percentage change in Users holding. Further, we specify a dummy variable,
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EligibleDummy, taking the value of 1 if market capitalization is above $25 million, and
zero otherwise. Having excluded all stocks with prices below $1, market capitalization is
our sole running variable. Lastly, mktcap_centered represents the distance in observed
market capitalization from the threshold of $25 million, while Price and MAX (past
maximum returns) are included as control variables. The extensive step-by-step approach
of specifying our regression model is explained in section C1 of the appendix.
We run four separate linear regressions – each with different bandwidths. The
results are summarized in table 7.1 below.
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Table 7.1: Regression Discontinuity on lottery stock preferences
This table reports the multiple linear regression estimates for the logarithm of the
number of users holding, proxying for retail investors’ preferences, on market
capitalization (the running variable), an eligibility dummy indicating stock tradability of
fractional share trading, stock price, past maximum return measured over the previous
month and past month’s observed idiosyncratic skewness. Models (1) to (4) are specified
using different bandwidths. Market capitalization is centred to indicate the distance of
each observation from the cut-point. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
log(Users holding)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EligibleDummy  0.368⇤  0.104  0.037  0.389
( 1.761) ( 0.349) ( 0.089) ( 0.391)
mktcap_centered 0.016⇤⇤  0.0003  0.012 0.431
(2.068) ( 0.011) ( 0.159) (0.493)
Price  0.104⇤⇤⇤  0.125⇤⇤⇤  0.173⇤⇤⇤  0.159⇤⇤⇤
( 12.725) ( 9.297) ( 8.054) ( 4.113)
MAX 0.013⇤⇤⇤ 0.016⇤⇤⇤ 0.018⇤⇤ 0.022
(3.654) (3.019) (2.594) (1.208)
lagged_iskew 0.209⇤⇤⇤ 0.109  0.014  0.158
(3.444) (1.200) ( 0.126) ( 0.667)
Constant 5.886⇤⇤⇤ 5.827⇤⇤⇤ 6.188⇤⇤⇤ 6.299⇤⇤⇤
(40.250) (26.951) (21.320) (8.185)
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS
Bandwidth 25 10 5 1
Observations 552 230 125 28
Adjusted R2 0.272 0.316 0.379 0.383
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Despite being negative across all four models, the causal treatment effect on
log(Users holding), measured by the coefficient of the EligibleDummy, is only significant
when we apply the widest bandwidth – questioning the validity of the inference we can
derive from this analysis. While we cannot decisively conclude that the treatment effect
is significant, all models indicate a negative relationship between log(Users holding) and
the EligibleDummy.
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Accounting for the number of observations reported across the four models, a
great concern of our RD design is the small sample size, which equals 552 observations
at most. This concern is evident when we narrow our bandwidth from 25, regressing
our models on only 230, 125 and 28 observations respectively. In light of the findings
of Jacob et al. (2012), which is commented in section 7.4.7, basing our RD design on a
considerable sample size is crucial for obtaining precise estimates. On the other hand, the
narrower the bandwidth we apply, the more representative the causal effect will be of
the stocks near the threshold. Faced with a weigh-off between sample size and choice of
bandwidth, our findings require caution when trying to conclude on any causal relationship
between preferences for return skewness and stock tradability. However, by following
the recommendations of Jacob et al. (2012), we give priority to sample size, placing
more trust in the estimates derived from model (1). Thus, interpreting the estimated
coefficient of EligibleDummy, we find evidence suggesting that retail investors’ exhibit
a preference against lottery-type stocks when we control for stock tradability. Since we
have log-transformed our dependent variable, the reduction in lottery-stock preferences
on aggregate equals -30.79% (⇡ (e( 0.368)   1) ⇤ 100).
The coefficient for mktcap_centered represents the percentage change in number
of users holding, per $1M unit increase in market capitalization above the threshold.
For example, in model (1) we expect the number of users holding to increase by 1.61%
(⇡ (e(0.016)   1) ⇤ 100), for every $1M unit increase in market capitalization above $25M.
The included controls, Price and MAX, are both significant and show the expected signs
across all four models. Higher prices are associated with a significantly lower number of
users holding, while past extreme returns show the opposite relationship. In attempting
to ascribe retail investors’ preferences for lottery-type stocks to either low prices or highly
skewed return features, we choose to concentrate our analysis around the two lottery
characteristics. Accordingly, there will be certain factors, such as interest rates, taxation
policies, analyst coverage and so on, which also affect investor preferences. These factors
are unaccounted for in our model and thus constitute the error term.
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7.4 Considerations and internal validity
7.4.1 Optimal bin width
To avoid any potential bias from specifying a too narrow or wide bin width range when
presenting graphical presentations of our RD design, the literature recommends conducting
both informal and formal tests to find the most appropriate bin width (Jacob et al., 2012).
Accordingly, we plot eligibility against the market capitalization of all observations in our
sample using different bin widths, ranging from 0.5 to 5. Next, we visually inspect and
compare each of the plots to determine whether we observe any significant changes in the
relationship between the two variables. These figures are attached in section C2 of the
appendix.
The relationship between our outcome and running variable is largely unaffected
when we alter the bin width, indicating that all three bin widths pose as equally appropriate
options. Based on these results, we deem the informal test to be sufficient in determining
the optimal bin width, using a bin width of 2 in the further analyses.
7.4.2 Exogeneity in the cut-point
Assessing the internal validity it also important to determine whether the running variable,
or cut-point, could have been manipulated. We have not been able to establish exactly
why the cut-point is set at $25 million in market capitalization, but believe that this
threshold is set somewhat arbitrarily.
Moreover, we assume that firms are unable to precisely determine their own
market capitalization with respect to the threshold set by Robinhood. The rationale is
that market capitalization is dependent on the contemporaneous demand among investors
in the market, preventing complete firm control over this measure. In accordance with
the research of Lee and Lemieux (2010), we therefore assume that stocks just above and
below the cut-point are “as if randomly assigned”. This randomization implies that the
variation in the treatment near the threshold is randomized as though from a randomized
experiment, allowing us to interpret the gap at the threshold intersect as the causal effect
of fractional share trading on retail investors’ preferences.
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7.4.3 Sharp versus Fuzzy-regression
Optimally, we would also control for “no-shows” or “crossovers”. A “no-show” in our sample
would be any observation which is not traded fractionally despite being eligible, while a
“crossover” would be an ineligible stock being traded fractionally. We are however unable
to precisely observe if such instances occur, as Robinhood has no public information about
their rigidness to these rules. Nonetheless, we choose to believe Robinhood’s statement,
and have as such constructed the RD to be sharp by design.
7.4.4 Comparison of non-outcome variables by propensity score
matching
We also conduct an analysis of the relationship between the non-outcome variables and
the running variable to ensure that neither of our covariates are affected by the treatment.
To determine the comparability of eligible and ineligible stocks near the threshold, we
gather data on several firm-specific characteristics and run two sample t-tests for equality
in means. Due to the very nature of lottery-type stocks being rare, and also to the
FST-service being fairly new, our data sample is restricted with respect to size. With a
small sample, group means, and also the estimated p-values of the associated t-tests, are
sensitive to extreme observations. To enhance accuracy and mitigate potential bias in the
estimation of group means, we therefore use the method of propensity score matching
prior to conducting the two-sample t-tests.
In addition to the characteristics previously mentioned, we include four valuation
multiples: enterprise value (evm), price-earnings (pe_inc), price-sales (ps) and price-
to-book (ptb). We also include dividend payout ratio (drp) and three capital structure
ratios: debt over EBITDA (debt_ebitda), cash over debt (cash_debt) and debt over equity
(de_ratio). The results are reported in table 7.2 below.
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Table 7.2: Comparison of group means in non-outcome variables
This table reports monthly means of firm characteristics of stocks traded on the
Robinhood-platform across our sample period. To compare equality near the threshold,
eligible and ineligible stocks are matched based on propensity scores. Columns 0 and 1
refer to the control and the treated group respectively, SMD reports the standard mean
differences between the matched samples, while p-value shows the results of the
two-sample t-test of equality in means.
Measure (mean(sd)) 0 1 p-value SMD
N 328 328
Price 8.65 (8.59) 12.62 (8.27) <0.001 0.471
IVOL 3.04 (1.35) 2.55 (1.43) <0.001 0.347
ISKEW 1.07 (1.02) 1.14 (1.15) 0.374 0.069
bm 1.65 (1.19) 1.81 (1.62) 0.136 0.117
mkt 0.25 (5.30) -0.37 (5.54) 0.138 0.116
smb -2.11 (2.11) -2.06 (1.94) 0.763 0.024
hml -0.29 (1.22) -0.44 (1.53) 0.163 0.109
evm 11.38 (11.26) 11.05 (9.83) 0.693 0.031
pe_inc 17.60 (18.18) 17.56 (18.81) 0.982 0.002
ps 0.86 (0.60) 0.90 (0.75) 0.466 0.057
ptb 0.80 (0.39) 0.91 (0.40) <0.001 0.279
dpr 0.79 (1.09) 0.70 (1.14) 0.292 0.082
debt_ebitda 3.17 (11.87) 4.08 (9.32) 0.278 0.085
cash_debt 0.30 (0.29) 0.25 (0.34) 0.018 0.185
de_ratio 0.79 (2.75) 1.79 (3.35) <0.001 0.326
We use strict requirements for matching to ensure firms are matched on equal
terms to avoid large distances between observations. The labels of 1 and 0 refers to the
treated and control observations, respectively, in which treated observations alludes to the
eligible stocks, and vice versa for the observations in the control group. SMD represents
the standard mean difference after matching, while p-value shows the results of the Welch
two sample t-tests for equality in group means.
In table 7.2, we observe significant differences in group means between some of
our non-outcome variables. However, observing some inequalities in group means across
a broad range of firm-characteristics is not surprising, in particular when we consider
the small size of our data sample. We also find solace by observing the assessment of
standardized mean differences before and after matching in figure 7.2 below. In the
following, we therefore assume that the equality of stocks near the threshold is acceptable
enough for us to draw inference from our sample. For closer analysis, distribution of
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propensity scores and histograms for the matched and unmatched samples, we refer to
section C3 of the appendix.
Figure 7.2: Standardized mean differences of non-outcome variables in the RD design,
before and after propensity score matching
This figure shows the standardized mean differences of all non-outcome variables before
and after propensity score matching. Black and white dots refer to the matched and
unmatched observations respectively.
7.4.5 Density of the running variable
As eligibility could provide certain benefits, we examine whether there are any significant
discontinuities at either side of the market capitalization threshold. If such discontinuities
exist, it would indicate that the observed values of market capitalization, or even the
placement of the cut-point itself, have been subject to some degree of manipulation. The
common approach is to plot the observed frequency of market capitalization at each point
along the x-axis, as reported in the figures of section C2 in the appendix. To formally test
this however, we also conduct a density test by method of McCrary (2007).
In the McCrary density test, we run two separate local linear regressions at either
side of the market capitalization threshold. The regressors are the midpoint values of each
running variable bin, while the frequency of each bin is the outcome. Due to our relatively
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small stock sample, we specify a broad bandwidth of 25. By observing the fitted lines
and their associated confidence intervals depicted in figure 7.3 – in which the estimated
p-value for the size of the overlap equals 0.78 – we once more reject manipulation of the
running variable.
Figure 7.3: Density plot of the RD running variable
This figure shows the density of the running variable, represented by the observed values
of market capitalization in our sample. Rather than reporting the frequency of each
observed value, market capitalization along the x-axis are grouped into bins, before
density is measured for each bin. The bold line represents the t-tests of difference in
means at either side of the cut-point of $25M, while the shaded area represents the
confidence intervals of the t-tests. The black and red line refers to observations below and
above the cut-point, respectively.
In conclusion, after confirming exogeneity in the cut-point, rejecting manipulation
in the running variable, examining the non-outcome variables and establishing that the
treatment is “as if randomly assigned", we conclude that the internal design is valid.
7.4.6 Functional form
The decision to apply linear regression in our RD design is a result of careful consideration
of the relationship between the outcome and running variable, absent of treatment. The
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conventional approach is to test a variety of functional forms and choosing the specification
yielding the best fit (Cook, 2008) (van der Klaauw, 2008). With a limited data set, we
choose to follow the recommendations of Jacob et al. (2012), who emphasize that for
relatively small data sets, the parametric estimation approach is best suited. In doing so,
we are sacrificing potentially unbiased estimates, in exchange for making full use of the
limited data we have available.
7.4.7 Model critique
Lastly, we evaluate the precision of the estimates obtained from our RD design. At most,
our sample consists of only 552 stock observations, posing a threat to the validity of the
conclusions we can draw from the results. Since the power to detect causal effects of an
RD design is weaker than that of a comparable randomized experiment, one generally
demands a larger sample size. Optimally, we should thus have more than twice the number
of observations than that in a randomized experiment to achieve the same precision (Jacob
et al., 2012). As the size of the sample is imperative in achieving precise estimates, we
choose to lay most of our trust in model (1) from table 7.1.
Another concern for our RD design is the generalizability of our estimates. By
design, our model only measures the local effects of tradability on stock holdings around
the cut-point of the running variable. If strictly interpreted, our findings does not provide
any information about the size of this effect for stocks with a market capitalization further
away from the $25 million threshold. In contrast, Lee and Lemieux (2010) offer a more
expansive interpretation, highlighting that (1) control over the running variable in RD
designs are typically imprecise and (2) the outcome variable usually contains considerable
occurrences of random errors. As both these incidents can be argued to occur in our RD
design, they induce heterogeneity to the cut-point, and increase the generalizability of our
findings. As previously argued, stocks in our RD design are subject to an “as if random”
assignment above and below the threshold. Following the insights offered by Lee and




To further test the effects of fractional share trading on retail investors’ behaviour, we
use a Difference-in-Difference approach. This design allows us to analyse the difference in
the average number of Robinhood users holding low- and high priced stocks before and
after the introduction of fractional share trading. We also conduct a subgroup analysis,
in which we follow the procedure of (Brookes et al., 2004) and interact our subgroup of
highly return skewed stocks with our treatment group, in order to estimate the difference
between the treatment effect on high- and low return skewed stocks.
To examine this effect, we exploit the $1 cut-point to define treatment. We also
use this threshold to categorize stocks as either low- or high-priced. However, eligibility
for FST is also conditional on a market capitalization rule. As we want to isolate the
effect of eligibility with respect to price, we only include stocks with a reported market
capitalization equal to or above the $25 million eligibility threshold. Our treatment group
is the remaining stocks with a price above $1 (high-priced and eligible) and our control
group is the remaining stocks with price below $1 (low-priced and ineligible).
As we are unable to observe the pace at which Robinhood actually implements
fractional share trading for stocks crossing the $1 threshold, we limit our DiD analysis
to a two-period model to reduce the risk of having non-compliance in our data set. This
decision is rooted in the observation that stocks routinely move back and forth between
the $1 threshold across the full sample period. If not accounted for, we run the risk of
having noncompliance in our data set, which will reduce the credibility of the estimated
treatment effect in the regression. Through our two-period DiD we also ensure that we
observe the same treatment and control groups at common dates both before and after
treatment. All observations prior to treatment are observed at the 1st of December 2019,
while we observe all stocks after treatment at February 1st, 2020. The choice of February
1st is made to allow for retail investors to adapt to the new service, and to account for
potential errors preventing stocks to be traded fractionally in the early phase of the
introduction. Moreover, as we are only interested in the aggregate preferences of retail
investors and use a two-period model, we choose to refrain from estimating the regression
with fixed effects.
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To dentify appropriate counterfactuals, we propensity match the treated
stocks with the non-treated stocks, based on book-to-market ratio, Standard Industry
Classification Code (SICC) and market capitalization. The propensity score is calculated
using a logit model to predict the probability of being traded fractionally – yielding an
estimated counterfactual stock for each eligible stock. We expect these two groups to have
a similar trend in the number of users owning these stocks, absent of treatment. This
crucial assumption allows us to draw a conclusion on whether there is an effect of being
traded fractionally – as any further difference between the retail investor stock holdings of
the two groups after FST must then be caused by the treatment. When we use propensity
matching to identify counterfactuals, we are left with a control group consisting of only 62
observations. This observation is however not too surprising, as there are only a reported
226 stocks with a reported price less than $1 on the NYSE, Nasdaq and AMEX per
December 2020, according to MarketWatch’s stock screener (MarketWatch, 2020). The
distribution plots and histograms of propensity score mathcing is enclosed in section D1
of the appendix.
As the parallel trend assumption is the most crucial assumption for our DiD-
model to be valid, we plot the observed aggregate number of Robinhood investors’ holding
both treated and non-treated stocks, before and after the introduction of FST. In an
attempt to capture the trend prior to treatment, we choose to include stock observations
from 2018. Even though there are some statistical tests for the parallel trend assumption,
these are critiqued as they are only able to measure this trend in the pre-treatment period,
and there is no commonly accepted procedure to be sure whether the common trend
still holds after the treatment period (Khan-Lang and Lang, 2018). One reason why a
parallel trend might not hold in our data is if the proportion of price-sensitive investors at
Robinhood is changed throughout the period. Then the low-priced stocks might exhibit
a trend caused by inflow of disproportionately price-sensitive investors, rather than an
increased preference for low-priced stocks. To our knowledge, however, Robinhood’s target
customer group did not change throughout this period, which leads us to believe that the
parallel trend assumption holds. We plot the trends to visually assess of the common
trend assumption in figure 7.4.
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Figure 7.4: Parallel trend assumption
This figure shows the observed time-series of the average number of Robinhood investors
holding both treated and non-treated stocks, before and after the introduction of FST.
The vertical line marks the date of the introduction.
Inspecting figure 7.4, the treatment and control group seem to exhibit similar
behaviour on average, suggesting that both groups likely had parallel trends prior to the
treatment. Moreover, it seems to be a considerable divergence in Robinhood investors’
holdings immediately after the introduction of fractional share trading on December 16th,
2019. We also note that the average number of retail investors in eligible stocks, i.e. stocks
with price above $1, is noticeably higher. We interpret this as a sign that the average
retail investor price threshold is above $1.
In equation 7.1 below, we report our Difference-in-Difference model, in which
both Eligible and After are binary variables. Eligible is equal to 1 for stocks eligible for
FST, defined by stock price equal to or above $1. After takes the value of 1 if the date is
after December 16th, 2019, and zero otherwise. log(Mktcap), log(Price) and log(MAX) are
included as control variables, and are log-transformed to mitigate the effect of potential
outliers in their positively skewed distributions. In the same spirit, we also log-transform
our dependent variable, Users holding. With a partial log-log regression model, the
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interpretation of the estimated coefficients of the log-transformed variables changes, in
which a 1% increase in our explanatory variables translates to the approximate percentage
change in Users holding. For the coefficients of the non-transformed variables however, a
1 unit increase yields the approximate percentage change in Users holding.
log(Usersholding)i,t = ↵i,t +  1Eligible ⇤ Afteri +  2Eligiblei,t +  3Afteri+ (7.1)
 4log(Mktcap)i,t +  5log(Price)i,t +  6log(MAX)i,t + ✏i,t
The DiD estimate, given by the coefficient of the regular interaction term
Eligible*After, can be interpreted as the causal effect on stock ownership when stocks can
be traded fractionally. The reference category for this regression is thus the number of users
holding stocks with price less than $1 before fractional share trading was implemented.
In order to investigate our Wealth Constraint Hypothesis, we also run a subgroup
analysis of the stocks with return skewness above median by interacting this group with
the DiD estimator from equation 7.1. Thus, for our hypothesis to be correct, the causal
effect on the number of Robinhood holding stocks that are being traded fractionally should
be less than for stocks with low return skewness. The final model is therefore extended to:
log(Usersholding)i,t = ↵i,t+ 1Eligible⇤After⇤HighSkewi+ 2Eligible⇤Afteri+ (7.2)
 3Eligiblei,t +  4Afteri +  5log(Mktcap)i,t +  6log(Price)i,t +  7log(MAX)i,t + ✏i,t
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Table 7.3: Difference-in-Difference regressions on retail investor demand after the
introduction of Fractional Share Trading
This table reports the DiD panel regressions. The number of Robinhood users holding a
stock is log-transformed and included as the dependent variable. Eligible indicates
whether a stock is eligible for FST, After takes the value of 1 if the stock is observed after
the introduction of FST, while HighSkew indicates the stocks with above median return
skewness. Model (1) captures the causal effect of fractional share trading on retail
demand for high-priced, eligible stocks, while model (2) in addition controls for high
return skewness. The log of market cap, price and past maximum return are included as


























Fixed Effects No No
Observations 124 124
R2 0.641 0.646
Adjusted R2 0.623 0.615
F Statistic 34.848⇤⇤⇤ (df = 6; 117) 20.647⇤⇤⇤ (df = 10; 113)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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If we are to believe the DiD-estimator given in model (1), expressed by the
term Eligible*After, the introduction of fractional share trading will causally increase the
number of users holding high-priced stocks by 3.7 percent on average. This result is not
close to significant, so this result should not be interpreted as anything else than a trend
in the data. When we extend our model to also include a subgroup analysis of highly
return skewed stocks in model (2), this coefficient changes significantly. We interpret
this as a sign of the inherent uncertainty of the coefficient of model (1). Consequently,
reporting an exact magnitude of the treatment effect is speculative, and we therefore limit
ourselves to noting that the trend is positive in both models.
The main coefficient of interest in model (2) is however the double interaction
term, Eligible*After*HighSkew. The coefficient is negative and insignificant, and expresses
the difference in the magnitude of the effect of fractional share trading between stocks
with highly skewed returns and stocks with low return skewness. The coefficient shows
that there is about a 50% difference between these two stock groups, in which the stocks
with above median return skewness are at the negative side of the difference. Nevertheless,
these coefficients are insignificant, and we cannot draw any conclusion based on this
analysis. These results are highly significant. The trend is however in favour of our Wealth
Constraint Hypothesis - retail investors shy away from stocks with highly skewed returns
when their wealth constraints are reduced.
Finally, we note that the coefficients of log(Mktcap), log(Price) and have the
expected signs. Thus, a 1% increase in market capitalization is associated with about a
0.75% increase in the number of users holding a stock. Also, a 1% increase in the number
of users holding is associated with a decrease of about 1.12% in the number of users
holding a stock on average. We also note that the estimated coefficient of log(MAX) is
positive but insignificant. This result is however not surprising, as the model accounts for
the time-dimension through the After dummy.
7.5.1 Model critique
There are several weaknesses in the estimates obtained in the previous section. First, the
is little economic significance of a threshold set at $1 for FST eligibility. Whereas we do
believe retail investors are sensitive to the nominal stock price, we also believe that the
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actual significance on retail investor holdings is more profound when prices are further
away from $1. As the descriptive statistics in table 7.4 shows, the median price of the
treated stocks is $4.23, which is arguably too small to make any economic impact on retail
investor behavior. This view is further supported by the parallel trend plot in figure 7.4,
in which stocks with price above $1 also have considerably more users holding. The table
also shows that the distribution of stock prices is skewed towards relatively low prices. If
the threshold was rather set at a price with more economic significance, we expect the
observed effects to be more pronounced. A solution to this problem might be to remove
all stocks above a price threshold (say $10) and run the regression again. However, this
modification would likely weaken the matching of the groups, as one can argue that there
are fundamental differences between low- and high-priced stocks.
Table 7.4: Descriptive price statistics of treated and control stocks










Number of observations 62 62
The number of observations is also a cause of concern for both models, but
perhaps more so when conducting our subgroup analysis. The subgroup analysis requires
the data to be subdivided into even smaller groups (low versus high), which reduces the
ability of the regression to detect a treatment effect (Brookes et al., 2004). Thus, with
a small data set, our subgroup analysis is more likely to report false negatives, and is
therefore less reliable than the analysis in model (1).
In sum, we consider this model too unreliable to conclude on any findings, due
to a small data set, and to the fact that the economic significance of the $1 threshold is
arguably too small to detect any treatment effect. Nevertheless, we note that the trend is
in favour of our Wealth Constraint Hypothesis.
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7.6 Correlational analysis of idiosyncratic skewness
and retail investment
Finally, we run multiple linear regression to further test the relationship between
idiosyncratic skewness and retail investment. In line with the Wealth Constraint Hypothesis,
and our findings in the analyses above, this relationship should be insignificant when
controlling for stock tradability. Hence, given the opportunity to trade a wider spectrum
of stocks, retail investors should shy away from stocks with highly skewed returns.
To test this prediction, we redefine our model specification, including idiosyncratic
skewness as our dependent variable. The time span covered in this model is the period after
fractional share trading was implemented. We use mktcap_centered, EligibleDummy, Users
holding and an interaction term of the EligibleDummy and Users holding are included as
regressors. EligibleDummy is equal to 1 for all stocks that are traded fractionally, and
zero otherwise.
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Table 7.5: OLS on idiosyncratic skewness and stock tradability
This table reports the OLS regression estimates for idiosyncratic skewness, proxying as a
lottery characteristic, on market capitalization (the running variable), number of
Robinhood investors holding, an eligibility dummy indicating stock tradability of
fractional share trading, and an interaction term between Robinhood investors holding
and the eligibility dummy. Market capitalization is centred to indicate the distance of
















Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
As we see in table 7.5, Users holding is positive and significant, and we can
interpret the estimated coefficient of 0.0002 as the average increase in idiosyncratic skewness
of an ineligible stock’s return that is associated with one additional investor in that stock.
The relationship between Users holding and Idiosyncratic skewness disappears when we
control for tradability through the interaction term EligibleDummy*Users holding. This
finding strengthens our argument that, when controlling for tradability, retail investors do
not actively pursue stocks with skewed returns. The trend found in the RDD and DiD
analyses is also more convincing when seen in relation to this finding.
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Figure 7.5: Relationship between idiosyncratic skewness and eligibility
This figure shows the observed idiosyncratic skewness of stock returns above and below
the eligibility threshold of $25M, using a bandwidth of 25. The vertical line marks the
cut-point.
In order to verify our choice of functional form, we have also plotted the
observations of idiosyncratic skewness against the running variable. Similarly to the
number of Robinhood investors holding plotted in 7.1, the linear regression appears to be
the best fit as the observed idiosyncratic skewness are homogenously distributed across
the plot.
7.7 Generalizability of findings
A considerable cause of concern for the generalizability of our results is the
representativeness of Robinhood investors for retail investors as a whole. First, Robinhood’s
investors have been described in the media as being young millennials, as their average
user per 2020 is 31 years old (Rooney, 2020). Additionally, 78% of Robinhood’s users
were under the age of 35 in 2017, which is a critical drawback of our analysis (Harris,
2017). Moreover, Robinhood investors are being described as more risk-seeking, as the
Robinhood app is a gamified experience - for example displaying confetti when users
purchase stocks (Ingram, 2019). Thus, many believe that gamblers turn to Robinhood as
a complement to sports betting or the like (Maggiulli, 2020). These issues pose a threat
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to the generalizability of Robinhood investors’ preference for return skewness, which is
a key feature of our lottery-like stocks. Additionally, young investors with low portfolio
value are more likely to invest through mobile apps (Lin and Mottola, 2019), which makes
this group more likely to exhibit capital constraints when investing in the stock market.
As a conclusion, we note that the Robinhood investors’ preferences for lottery-like stocks
might be more pronounced than average. However, we would not go as far as detaching
this group from other retail investment brokers as a whole and argue that the mechanisms
our analyses show are likely to persist to some extent if one were to expand the sample to
other retail brokers as well.
7.8 Implications of findings
From our analysis, we find some evidence, although not fully conclusive, suggesting that
retail investors are overly concentrated in lottery-type stocks due to wealth constraints.
Expanding on our findings, we argue that fractional share trading, through providing retail
investors access to a broader investment universe, reduces friction and increases efficiency
in the capital markets. In particular, we would expect the pronounced overpricing in
lottery-type stocks to gradually disappear, as retail investors are able to shift towards
stocks with higher prices and lower return skewness. Accordingly, we expect the existence
of negative lottery premiums to be reduced if fractional share trading is offered to a wide
spectrum of investors. As retail investors, and Robinhood investors especially, account for
a small percentage of the total market, we are however uncertain of the effect on efficiency
for the market as a whole.
Removal of the price barrier will also reduce firms’ incentives to perform active
stock price management. Stock price management, for example through stock splits,
usually appear as bad value propositions, incurring costs while providing no added
fundamental value. As previously mentioned however, proponents of the Marketability
Hypothesis argue that firms should actively keep nominal stock prices low, as part of a
marketability scheme to attract certain investors. While such a hypothesis could hold, the
introduction of fractional share trading reduces managers’ incentives for such activities.
Thus, firms have less incentives to target investors through low nominal prices if fractional
share trading is implemented on a wide basis.
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We would however like to emphasize that there are considerable uncertainty
associated with our findings, both due to the limited sample size, but also because the
FST-service is relatively young. As a consequence, the estimates and results obtained
from both our RD and DiD designs must be interpreted with caution. Thus, the effect of
fractional share trading on retail investor demand for low- and high-priced stocks should
be retested when more data is available. Future research should also examine whether the
observed effects are consistent across different brokerage platforms.
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8 Conclusion
We find evidence, although not conclusive, that retail investors on aggregate show a
preference against lottery-type stocks once we control for stock tradability through the
Fractional Share Trading service. This trend is documented using the methodologies of
Regression Discontinuity Design, Difference-in-Difference and standard OLS. Our findings
give support to the proposed Wealth Constraint Hypothesis - in which we expect retail
investors to drive the negative lottery premiums in the stock market, as their wealth
constrained investment universe is inherently more lottery-like. Although the results from
both experimental designs are subject to considerable uncertainty, we observe a common
trend in all three models: retail investors shift towards stocks with less skewed returns
once their capital limitations are reduced.
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A1 Data screening, cleaning and matching
For each stock we obtain gvkey (firm identifier), unadjusted daily prices (mean absolute
value of the bid-ask spread), a daily adjustment factor, a total daily return factor,
exchange- and industry codes and number of shares outstanding from the Compustat
database (Wharton Research Data Services, 2020). All stock prices are denominated in
dollars. Further, we also retrieve balance sheet data, including shareholder equity, total
equity, total assets, total liabilities, tax investment credits, deferred taxes and preferred
stock redemption-, liquidity- and par value. We also download daily popularity data on
the number of Robinhood investors holding U.S. stocks from Robintrack (2020).
Daily returns are computed by applying the Compustat convention of dividing
unadjusted closing prices with a daily adjustment factor, before multiplying with a total
daily return factor. Inspired by Ince and Porter (2006), we omit any daily returns above
400% and below -85% to adjust for outliers and errors in the data set. We also set both Rt
and Rt-1 to NA if Rt or Rt-1 is greater than 300% and if (1+Rt)-(1+Rt-1)-1 is less than
50% (indicating extreme reversal). Note that subscript t in this case refers to monthly
returns.
Excess returns, both daily (d) and monthly (t), are calculated as returns on the
market minus the appropriate risk-free rates. As a proxy for the risk-free rates, we use
the time series of 1-month T-bill rates from the U.S. Department of the Treasury (U.S.
Treasury, 2020). Since the risk-free rates are reported on a monthly basis, we convert the
rates from monthly to daily by the common convention:
rfd = (1 + rft)
1
d   1
where d refers to number of days in month t
Market capitalization is computed as the stock price times the number of shares
outstanding. In order to compute the book-to-market ratio, we derive the book equity
value from the financial data obtained from Compustat. We apply the following formula
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to back out the book equity value of each stock:
Book Equity=(total equity + total assets + tax credits + deferred taxes) – (total
liabilities + preferred stock redemption value - preferred stock liquidity - preferred stock
par value)
A2 Variable explanation
After downloading, screening, cleaning and matching the necessary data, we are left with
a data set on U.S. common stocks across the time period of 2000 to 2020. The data set is
balanced, and comprises the following variables:
gvkey : firm identifier
date: year-month-day
reference_date: date for Fama-French portfolio sorting
exchange: exchange code
ret : return on market
rf : proxy for risk-free rate
R: excess return
prccd : unadjusted stock price
mktcap: market capitalization, Fama-French size proxy
bm: book-to-market ratio, Fama-French value proxy
mktcap_weight : market capitalization on June each year
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Appendix 2: Replication of lottery
stock premiums
This part provides additional analyses related to the replication efforts described in section
6. As we question the role of idiosyncratic volatility as a lottery characteristic, we first run
cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions on two separate lottery portfolios.
The first portfolio is sorted using the traditional lottery definition of Kumar (2009), while
the second portfolio is sorted only on stock price and idiosyncratic skewness. In doing so,
we are able to investigate the existence of lottery stock premiums under different lottery
stock definitions. We also present an overview of the correlations between the estimated
lottery characteristics. Moreover, by taking basis in the lottery portfolio sorted under
the alternative lottery stock definition, we investigate portfolio performance and time
series effects of the lottery stock premium across our sample period. Lastly, we conduct a
robustness analysis to ensure the validity of our results.
B1 Results with traditional and alternative lottery
stock definition
In table B1.1, we present the results of the cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions on
the two lottery portfolios. The first portfolio is sorted on the three traditional lottery
characteristics proposed by Kumar (2009), while the second portfolio constitutes stocks
with price below median and idiosyncratic skewness above median. If idiosyncratic
volatility is merely a consequence of retail activity, and not a lottery feature, we would
expect the lottery premiums to be equally pronounced when we regress both portfolios.
Note that model (2) in table B1.1 is the same as in table 6.1. In this part
however, we have altered the variable name to AlternativeLotteryDummy. This is done in
order to readily compare the premiums from section 6 with the estimated premiums from
a lottery portfolio sorted on the three traditional lottery characteristics, represented by
TraditionalLotteryDummy. The output in table B1.1 report the existence of significantly
negative lottery premiums when we regress on both the traditional and the alternative
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lottery portfolio. The estimated lottery premiums are -0.785 and -0.501, respectively, both
significant at the 1% level. In annual terms, this adds to -9.42% and -6,01%.
54 B1 Results with traditional and alternative lottery stock definition
Table B1.1: Lottery premiums with traditional and alternative lottery stock definition
This table reports the Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression
estimates for the value-weighted excess return on both the traditional and alternative
lottery-type portfolio. Model (1) is regressed on a portfolio sorted using the traditional
lottery-stock definition of Kumar (2009), while model (2) is regressed on the alternative
lottery portfolio – sorted on below median price and above median idiosyncratic skewness.
Contemporaneous factor betas for the Fama-French risk factors (mkt, smb, hml), size (log
of market value), book-to-market and lagged 6-month return are included as controls.
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Dependent variable:























Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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In conclusion, we document the existence of negative lottery premiums during
the last two decades in the American stock market using two different lottery stock
definitions. This finding is also consistent with the previous research on lottery premiums,
documented by Kumar (2009). Moreover, and perhaps even more interesting, we find
these premiums to be somewhat equally pronounced, and significant, when we construct a
lottery portfolio using our alternative lottery definition. Despite only being a correlational
analysis, this yields enhanced support to the claim that idiosyncratic volatility is not a
lottery feature of attraction, but rather a consequence of retail investor activity. Based on
these findings, we therefore take basis in our alternative lottery stock definition in the
following replication efforts.
B2 Correlation of lottery characteristics
In spite of our main analysis only making use of idiosyncratic skewness to identify lottery-
type stocks, we however compute IVOL, using the three-factor model of Fama and French
(1993), and MAX, using the method of Bali et al. (2011) for our robustness analysis. In
table B2.1 we report the correlations between the three lottery characteristics.
Table B2.1: Correlation matrix of lottery characteristics
This figure reports the correlations between the three measured lottery characteristics –





MAX 0.892 0.389 1
We observe a considerable co-movement between idiosyncratic volatility and past
MAX -returns, with a correlation of just below 90%. This correlation suggests that stocks
exerting high idiosyncratic volatility also tend to yield more extreme positive returns.
Moreover, we observe a positive correlation of 38.9% between ISKEW and MAX, which is
consistent with the claim that retail investors could use past extreme returns as a proxy for
identifying skewness (Kumar, 2009) (Bali et al., 2011). Lastly, the estimated correlation
between IVOL and ISKEW is 14.6%, indicating a weak, but positive relationship between
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the two measures. This observed lack of co-movement is however consistent with our
predictions, as we clearly distinguish the two measures in our analysis – i.e. we view
idiosyncratic skewness as a lottery characteristic, while we deem idiosyncratic volatility to
be a consequence of retail investor activity.
B3 Portfolio performance
To evaluate the performance of the lottery portfolio, we apply portfolio thresholds in
similar fashion to the method proposed by Kumar (2009), and form our lottery-type
portfolio (Lottery-Type) of stocks with below median price (L) and above median return
skewness (H). Stocks with above median price (H) and below median return skewness (L)
make up the non-lottery-type portfolio (Non-Lottery-Type). The remaining stocks are
grouped in a residual portfolio labelled Other. The descriptive statistics of a selection of
firm characteristics across the three portfolios is reported in Table 6.2 and commented on
in section 6.3.
In addition to the three portfolios sorted on lottery stock characteristics, we
construct two new portfolios in order to measure performance in greater detail. LT-
NL represent a zero-net-investment portfolio that is long lottery-type stocks and short
non-lottery-type stocks. Hence, LT-NL is computed by subtracting the monthly value-
weighted returns of the Lottery-Type portfolio with ones from the Non-Lottery-Type
portfolio. LT-OL is constructed in similar fashion, except we subtract the stocks from the
Other portfolio.
In Figure B3.1, we compare portfolio performance by plotting the cumulative
value-weighted log-returns of the five portfolios across the sample period. We observe a
divergence between the lottery- and non-lottery portfolios, in which lottery-type stocks
underperform considerably. This difference is captured and portrayed in the LT-NL-
portfolio, yielding negative cumulative return of roughly 400% in 20 years. Controlling for
the validity, we observe dramatic drops in value-weighted cumulative returns across the
three sorted portfolios (Lottery-Type, Non-Lottery-Type and Other) in early 2000, 2008
and in 2020 – all consistent with periods of financial crises and distress.
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Figure B3.1: Portfolio performance from 2000 to 2020
This figure shows portfolio performances across the sample period of the five constructed
portfolios described in section B3, measured by cumulative value-weighted log-returns.
B4 Time series effects
In addition to investigating the lottery premiums on an aggregate firm-level, we also
observe the development of such premiums in the American stock market across our sample
period. By conducting yearly regressions on the alternatively sorted lottery portfolio,
we are able to compute the lottery premium time series, as reported in figure B4.1.
Plotted against the horizontal line set equal to zero, the lottery stock premium – though
exhibiting episodic and spontaneous behaviour – is predominantly negative with a mean
of -1.8% Moreover, we observe that the lottery stock premiums are most pronounced in
down-markets - i.e. during the financial crises in 2000, 2008 and most recently 2020 -
consistent with the findings of Chen et al. (2008) and Vokatá (2012).
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Figure B4.1: Time series of lottery stock premiums
This figure shows the estimated annual premiums on the lottery-type portfolio across the
sample period of 2000 to 2020. The dashed trend line is set equal to zero for means of
comparison, while the bold line and dots represent the estimated lottery premium for
each year. The mean value of the lottery premiums equals -1.8%.
B5 Robustness analysis
To verify and validate our results, we repeat the Fama-MacBeth-regressions for different
subsamples. We also include a regression model in which all variables, except for the
AlternativeLotteryDummy, are standardized (mean equal to zero and standard deviation
of 1). This modification is done to ensure that all variables are measured at equal scales,
mitigating any potential biases or spurious results of variables contributing differently to
the analysis. The four models are reported in Table B5.1 below.
Model (1) is the full sample regression model, while model (2) and (3) yield the
subsample results measured over the periods of 1999-2010 and 2011-2020, respectively.
Model (4) is the standardized model regressed on the full sample period.
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Table B5.1: Robustness analysis of lottery stock premiums
This table reports the Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression
estimates for the value-weighted excess return on the alternative lottery-type portfolio,
using different sample and variable specifications. Model (1) is regressed on the lottery
portfolio across the full sample period, while model (2) and (3) are estimated over the
periods of 1999-2010 and 2011-2020, respectively. Model (4) is specified by standardizing
all input variables. Contemporaneous factor betas for the Fama-French risk factors (mkt,
smb, hml), size (log of market value), book-to-market and lagged 6-month return are
included as controls. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
Value-weighted excess return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AlternativeLotteryDummy  0.501⇤⇤⇤  0.566⇤⇤⇤  0.283⇤⇤⇤  0.038⇤⇤⇤
( 5.386) ( 4.083) ( 2.653) ( 5.386)
mkt 0.937⇤⇤⇤ 0.669⇤⇤⇤ 0.888⇤⇤⇤ 0.389⇤⇤⇤
(5.008) (4.521) (2.724) (5.008)
smb  0.309 0.947⇤⇤ 0.785  0.069
( 0.874) (2.478) (1.622) ( 0.874)
hml 0.977⇤⇤⇤ 0.609⇤⇤⇤ 0.975⇤⇤⇤ 0.267⇤⇤⇤
(7.584) (5.914) (4.706) (7.584)
Log_mktcap 2.133⇤⇤⇤ 2.963⇤⇤⇤ 3.478⇤⇤⇤ 0.346⇤⇤⇤
(16.333) (13.197) (15.658) (16.333)
bm 0.883⇤⇤⇤ 0.984⇤⇤⇤ 1.005⇤⇤⇤ 0.094⇤⇤⇤
(11.852) (8.109) (10.784) (11.852)
LaggedR  0.011⇤⇤  0.015⇤⇤⇤  0.022⇤⇤⇤  0.011⇤⇤
( 2.500) ( 2.586) ( 3.534) ( 2.500)
Constant 13.465⇤⇤⇤ 11.416⇤⇤⇤ 10.689⇤⇤⇤ 1.029⇤⇤⇤
(6.207) (5.761) (3.533) (6.207)
Model Fama-MacBeth Fama-MacBeth Fama-MacBeth Fama-MacBeth
Sample Full 1999-2010 2011-2020 Full, standardized
Observations 671,039 380,025 291,014 671,039
R2 0.230 0.223 0.266 0.230
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
When altering the sample period or standardizing input variables, all estimated
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coefficient signs stay consistent and all significance levels persist – except for the smb-factor.
This result is explained in greater detail in section 6.2. By conducting separate regressions
across the different subsamples, we confirm that the existence of lottery premiums is
consistently significant over time. Moreover, as we interpret the same conclusion from the
standardized regression, we are confident that our initial regression model is implemented
without any measurement bias, and that our input variables contribute equally to the
analysis.
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Appendix 3: Regression Discontinuity
Design
C1 Model specification of RD design
Table C1.1: Step-by-step specification of Regression Discontinuity model
This table presents the step-by-step approach to specify the most appropriate regression
model for our RD design. All models report linear regression estimates for the log of
number of Robinhood investors holding stocks, proxying for retail investors’ behaviour.
Models (1) to (4) are regressed using different input control variables, one at a time.
Model (4) yields the final model, in which an eligibility dummy indicating stock
tradability, market capitalization, past maximum return measured over the previous
month, stock price, idiosyncratic skewness observed over the last month are included as
the covariates. Market capitalization is centred to indicate the distance of each
observation from the eligibility cut-point of $25 million in market capitalization.
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
log(Users holding)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EligibleDummy  0.488⇤⇤  0.385⇤  0.393⇤  0.368⇤
( 2.004) ( 1.802) ( 1.864) ( 1.761)
mktcap_centered 0.007 0.014⇤ 0.016⇤⇤ 0.016⇤⇤
(0.760) (1.747) (2.054) (2.068)






Constant 5.858⇤⇤⇤ 6.317⇤⇤⇤ 6.108⇤⇤⇤ 5.886⇤⇤⇤
(43.685) (51.374) (46.119) (40.250)
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 552 552 552 552
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.238 0.258 0.272
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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C2 Informal tests of optimal bin width
Figure C2.1: RD Running variable plotted with bin width equal to 2
This figure shows the counted frequency of market capitalization values above and below
the cut-point of $25M, represented by the black vertical line, using a bin width equal to 2.
Figure C2.2: RD Running variable plotted with bin width equal to 0.5
This figure shows the counted frequency of market capitalization values above and below
the cut-point of $25M, represented by the black vertical line, using a bin width equal to
0.5.
C3 Propensity score matching in RD design 63
Figure C2.3: RD Running variable plotted with bin width equal to 5
This figure shows the counted frequency of market capitalization values above and below
the cut-point of $25M, represented by the black vertical line, using a bin width equal to 5.
C3 Propensity score matching in RD design
Figure C3.1: Distribution of propensity scores for matched and unmatched samples in
the RD design
This figure shows the distribution of propensity scores for both matched and unmatched
treated and control units.
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Figure C3.2: Histograms for matched and unmatched samples in the RD design




D1 Propensity score matching in DiD design
Figure D1.1: Distribution of propensity scores for matched and unmatched samples in
the DiD design
This figure shows the distribution of propensity scores for both matched and unmatched
treated and control units.
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Figure D1.2: Histograms for matched and unmatched samples in the DiD design
This figure shows the histograms for both matched and unmatched treated and control
units.
